With nonstop development of communication technologies, all aspects of social life continuously change and so do network systems. When establishing connection is easy, the convenience of online-service receives many users' attentions, for example, the patients directly access medical system to be advised by doctors at any time. Therefore, user authentication scheme is necessary when we want to provide privacy and security for working sessions. Storing a password list for verification is an old method and not secure. This list can be easily leaked, and adversary can launch an offline password-guessing attack. In addition, information exchanged between user and server needs being prevented from attacker's decryption. It can be said that current authentication schemes are unsuitable for new security standard. We need a strong user authentication scheme using new approach to overcome existing limitations and guarantee time efficiency. In this paper, we make a design with Chebyshev polynomial to achieve our goals and resist some kinds of attacks.
Introduction
User authentication is one of the first important parts in all remote services. Furthermore, after successful authentication, partners secretly exchange the messages to each other and we need a session key to encrypt all these messages. Therefore, authentication scheme also needs a session key agreement phase. Especially, when the wearable devices become popular, such as smart-glasses or smart-watch, a user wants to connect to remote service through these low-power computing devices. Therefore, in addition to security, also we consider the time efficiency which is one of the important factors. There are many proposed results using cryptography primitives to make a reasonable user authentication scheme. Lamport [1] is the pioneer using hash function with password. His method is a usage of password-table for user verification in login phase. This is a simple way and easily implemented, but his scheme is vulnerable to verification stolen attack, and inappropriately using password can result in offline password-guessing attack. Then, there are many proposed schemes to enhance security. Typically, in 2004 Das et al. [2] proposed dynamic identity to provide user anonymity in his scheme. This is a positive idea, but in his scheme, he uses password instead of real user's identity to create a dynamic login message. This causes their scheme cannot resist passwordrelated attacks, and even the server may launch a passwordguessing attack to find real user's password.
In 2006, Yoon et al. [3] proposed dynamic identity scheme using time-stamp. This scheme overcomes the reflection attack existing in Liao et al. 's scheme [4] . Clearly, Yoon's scheme has important improved ideas to isolate such problems. However, they also use password to authenticate with online server, so their scheme is still vulnerable to passwordrelated attacks. Until now, password is still one of the most convenient factors in many authentication schemes, if only using this factor can be insecure. Using reasonable encryption scheme with block-cipher, such as Advance Encryption Standard (AES) or Triple Data Encryption Standard (T-DES), can enhance security for authentication scheme. Furthermore, if we only use hash function in scheme, this can increase authentication speed because time-cost of hash function is lower than the encryption scheme.
Security and Communication Networks
In addition to applying cryptography primitives, there is an approach using hard problems as security foundation, such as RSA or Elliptic curve crypto-systems (ECC). In 2009, Yang et al. [5] proposed a scheme in ECC. This is an efficient scheme because it uses discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems in elliptic curve. However, instead of using random values, they use point's coordinates to create a session key which does not satisfy perfect forward session key secrecy (PFS), one of the most standards to evaluate a strong authentication scheme. Therefore, some improved schemes were proposed, for instance, Islam et al. [6] . Their scheme used random values in creation of session key. However, his scheme is still vulnerable to known sessionspecific temporary information and denial of service attacks. In 2015 and 2016, Huang et al. [7] and Chaudhry et al. [8] proposed ECC-based authentication schemes, but these schemes cannot resist malicious user attack and does not provide PFS. Also, in 2015 Chaudhry et al. [9] proposed an authentication scheme in multiserver environment with general public key cryptography (RSA or ECC). However, their scheme needs a certificate agency (CA) to check the validity for the server's key pairs. Furthermore, all previous session keys will be recomputed if PFS appears. Compared with RSA, ECC can achieve the same security with a smaller key size. It can be said that ECC is one of the popular approaches many authors apply in authentication scheme because it offers better performance [10] .
Recently, Chebyshev polynomial is an approach many authors pay attention to. Although this method's computational cost is more than ECC's and it is being researched to be a standard such as RSA or ECC. However, this is a new method, so there are so many papers applying it into their schemes. At first, authentication schemes use polynomial on real field to make a security foundation, but Bergamo [11] proposed a solution to break its security. In 2013, Hao et al. [12] proposed a scheme in telecare medicine information system using polynomial in real field, but Lee et al. [13] discovered that this scheme is vulnerable to violation of the contributory of key agreements. And Lee proposed a different improved scheme. However, we see that his scheme is still vulnerable to what Hao's scheme did. Also, there are some papers [14, 15] facing the same problem which Lee and Hao did. To enhance security for Chebyshev polynomial, Zhang [16] extended the polynomial's semigroup property to the interval (-∞, +∞). Since then, Chebyshev polynomial can be placed in modular prime number field and receives more consideration of security analysis [17] . In 2016, Irshad et al. [18] proposed an authentication scheme in multiserver with Chebyshev. This scheme is designed with three actors suitable for global mobility network (Glomonet). However, a partial of information about registration centre's master key (K y ) can be leaked. In their scheme, they have PID i ⊕ K y = (q i ‖ ID ‖ PW). Clearly, the value and length of ID and PW is known, and any users easily guess by inspecting PID i = (x ‖easily guess) ⊕ ( i ‖ID ‖PW). Although all information of K y is not leaked, this is dangerous because user can collect many PID to find the "x" value. In 2017, Wang and Xu [19] proposed a reference model to solve the offline dictionary attacks. Their model is truly useful for designing many schemes with different approaches, such as RSA, ECC, or Chebyshev. It can be said that Chebyshev polynomial is a new approach which is being developed by many researchers and can be replaced for ECC or RSA in the future.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some background about Chebyshev polynomial. In Section 3, we review some previous typical schemes and analyse them on security aspect. Then in Section 4 we propose improved scheme in client-server environment using Chebyshev polynomial in modular prime number field. In Section 5, we analyse our proposed scheme on two aspects, namely, security and efficiency. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section 6.
Preliminaries
This section describes some features of Chebyshev polynomial in real and modular prime number fields [20] . Also, we give some different proofs compared with [21, 22] . Following are chaotic maps and two hard problems.
Chebyshev Chaotic Maps
. Its semigroup property is as follows:
In 2008, Zhang [16] extended (1) to the interval (-∞, +∞). Therefore, we have a different formula of Chebyshev polynomial as follows:
where p ∈ P, x ∈ [0, -1] and n ∈ N. We see that (2) can be changed to
2.2. The Hard Problems. In addition to four important properties, we have two computational problems on chaotic maps we apply in proposed user authentication scheme.
(i) The first problem is chaotic maps based discrete logarithm (CMDLP): Given ∈ [0, −1], p ∈ P, and x, it is hard to find r value such that T r (x) = y mod . We call this discrete logarithm problem on chaotic maps.
(ii) The second problem is chaotic maps based discrete logarithm (CMDHP): Given x ∈ [0, − 1], p ∈ P, T a ( ) mod , and T b ( ) mod , it is hard to find T ab ( ) mod . We call this Diffie-Hellman problem chaotic maps.
Cryptanalysis of Typical Related Works
In this section, we review some typical related works applying Chebyshev chaotic map in user authentication schemes. Also, we analyse on their security. 
s incoming smartcard and inserts t into it.
(3) Authentication phase. When U authenticates with S, U provides (ID, PW) and smartcard into the terminal. Below are some steps for authentication (see Figure 1 ): 
Once receiving U's messages, S computes = T s ( (x)) and decrypts E (H , H * , R) with and s. Finally, S compares H ?= H. If this holds, S returns R * = E s (ID, H * ) to smartcard, then it updates R = R * .
Security Analysis on Han-Yu Lin's Scheme.
In this subsection, we also review some limitations existing in this scheme. user's smartcard. With H, malicious user builds H ?= h(PW, t) and Han-Yu Lin's scheme is vulnerable to this kind of attack.
(ii) Also, Han-Yu Lin's scheme is vulnerable to contributory property of key agreement. In this scheme, S can determine common session key without U's random value. Below are some steps S can perform:
(2) Then, S chooses session key and computes v = (cos
So, Lin's scheme is vulnerable to this property.
Hongfeng Zhu's Scheme.
Zhu's scheme [24] includes four phases: registration, login, authentication, and password change phases.
(1) Registration phase. In this phase, the user U chooses password PW a , then randomly chooses value t, and computes
(2) Login-authentication phases (see Figure 2 ). In this phase, U inputs (ID a , PW a ) and U's device randomly chooses two values k, R to compute
and master key s. Then, S decrypts C to recover
If this holds, S randomly chooses r and computes V
(3) Password change phase. In this phase, U provides old PW a , new a , and ID. Then, the device chooses random value k and computes 
Clearly, password change phase is more efficient than previous old phase.
Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme using Chebyshev polynomial includes five phases: initialization, registration, authentication, and biometrics update phases. Below are some notations used in our scheme: Figure 3) . Figure 4) .
When receiving i 's login message, S computes i and i * , where i = (R ) mod p, ID i = CID ⊕ h( i ) and
If this does not hold, S terminates the session. Otherwise, S chooses S ∈[1, − 1] and computes S = (
. If this holds, S accepts U i . U i and S use sk to encrypt the information after authentication phase. 
Biometrics Update Phase. When i changes his/her biometrics, i 's SC checks if i ?= h( i ‖ N). If this holds,
SC computes = h( ‖ N) and ℎ = (h( i ‖ ℎ )) mod p + ℎ i - (h( i ‖ ℎ i )) mod p.
Assumptions

A 1 : U |≡(U← →S) -U believes U can share ID with S A 2 : U |≡(U← →S) -U believes U can share K with S A 3 : U |≡(S ⇒(U← →S)) -U believes S controls the sharing of sk between U and S A 4 : S |≡(U ⇒(U← →S)) -S believes U controlsthe sharing of ID between U and S A 5 : S |≡(U ⇒(U← →S)) -S believes U controls the sharing of sk between U and S
A 6 : S |≡(S← →U) -S believes S can share K with U A 7 : U |≡ #(r S ⊗ K) -U believes the challenge messages from S is fresh A 8 : S |≡ #(r U ⊗ K) -S believes the challenge messages from U is fresh
Security and Efficiency Analyses
In this section, we analyse our scheme on security and efficiency aspects. Also, our scheme's design is correctly proved with BAN-logic [25] , while its security is presented in each concrete attack case.
Correctness Analysis.
Before getting into details about security, we will prove our scheme's correctness with BANlogic. We inherit some objectives from [26] because we see that they are reasonable ones, which authentication scheme must achieve to successfully share partner's identities and session keys. For simplicity, we let K denote user's long-term key shared by server at registration phase, sk denote session key, and ⊗ denote Chebyshev operation. Firstly, our scheme must satisfy some assumptions as shown in Table 1 (this is a must in this model) These assumptions represent the first necessary believes of user and server. For example, when the users register with server, it is mean that they believe they can share identity with server (A 1 ). Next, we will normalize all messages exchanged between user and server. 
U← →S>
The normalization is an arrangement of information exchanged between user and server. For example, CID contains identity, challenge information r U ⊗ K, and long-term key K. Normalization helps to highlight the important data in the messages. Next, we will demonstrate how our scheme satisfies seven lemmas that we reorganized from [32].
Lemma . If the server believes authentication key (long-term key) is successfully shared with user and the user's messages encrypted with this key are fresh, the server will believe that the user believes his/her identity is successfully shared with server.
|≡ ( ← → ) , |≡ # ( ⊗ ) |≡ ( |≡ ( ← → )) (4) Security and Communication Networks 7
Proof. With A 6 and CID, we apply message-meaning rule to have
With A 8 , we apply freshness rule to have
With (5) and (6), we apply nonce-verification rule to have
With (7), we apply believe rule:
So, with A 6 and A 8 we successfully demonstrate how our scheme satisfies Lemma 1.
Lemma . If the server believes the user also believes his/her identity is successfully shared with each other and user totally controls this identity's sharing, the server also believes user's identity is successfully shared with each other.
|≡ ( |≡ ( ← → )) , |≡ ( ⇒ ( ← → ))
|≡ ( ← → ) With (12) and (13), we apply nonce-verification rule to have
With (14), we apply believe rule to have
So, with A 2 and A 7 we successfully demonstrate how our scheme satisfies Lemma 3. In short, with three lemmas we can say that both server and user believe and successfully share their identities with each other. Next, we need to prove the similar thing for session key.
Lemma . If the user believes that authentication key is successfully shared with server and server's messages encrypted with this key are fresh, the user will believe the server also believes session key is successfully shared with each other.
|≡ ( ← → ) , |≡ # ( ⊗ ) |≡ ( |≡ ( ← → )) (16)
Proof. With A 2 and US , we apply message-meaning rule to have
With A 7 and US , we apply freshness rule to have
With (17) and (18) 
Lemma . If the server believes authentication key is successfully shared with user and the user's messages encrypted with
this key are fresh, the server will believe the user also believes this session key's sharing.
Proof. With A 6 and M US , we apply message-meaning rule to have
With A 8 and M US , we apply freshness rule to have
With (24) and (25), we apply nonce-verification to have
With A 6 and (26), we apply believe rule to have
So, with A 6 and A 8 , we successfully demonstrate how our scheme satisfies Lemma 6.
Lemma .
If the server believes the user totally controls the session key's sharing, the server will believe the session key is successfully shared with user.
Proof. With (26) and A 5 , we apply message-meaning rule to have
With (29), we apply believe rule to have
So, with A 5 we completely demonstrate how our scheme satisfies Lemma 7. Finally, we can say that both server and user believe the common session key in our scheme.
Security Analysis.
Before getting into details about some kinds of attacks, we will use random oracle model to prove the security for the session key in Chebyshev polynomial case (see [27, 28] for more details). At first, we need to remind the model's circumstance. Assuming another actor B has Ω = { T p (x), T q (x) }) and B needs to compute T p×q (x), B has some oracles Client andServer with all their instances at different times. B also has an algorithm A being able to break our scheme to compute the session key with given probability . B will use A to find the session key and then compute T p×q (x) to solve CMDHP. To achieve this, B must "inject" Ω's parameters into the messages when A interacts with the oracles' instances, and B also simulates an appropriate environment suitable for A to operate. Note that our scheme uses hash function and it is considered as an oracle. Next, we claim our theorem about the session key's security. eorem . Let A be an adversary breaking our scheme in the meaning of AKESecurity in time t A , using q Send Send queries and q Hash Hash queries. We have
where B is an adversary breaking CMDHP in B . The meaning of theorem is that A's successful probability breaking our scheme in the meaning of AKESecurity is less than B's successful probability breaking CMDHP. According to CMDHP, B's success probability is extremely low, and so is A's successful probability breaking our scheme. Therefore, we can claim that our scheme has secure session key in the meaning of AKESecurity. 
In this subsection, we analyse our scheme on security aspect (see Table 2 ).
(1) Password-guessing attack. If the smartcard's information is leaked, and the adversary can exploit to perform password-guessing attack. Therefore, the adversary has i = h(B i ‖ N) in the smartcard. Differently from password, B i is the user's biometrics and it cannot be predicted. In short, our scheme easily resists this kind of attack.
(2) Replay attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary can replay the login message to impersonate the user. In our scheme, the adversary can replay { i , CID, M i , R } to the server. Then, the server replies { S , M S } to the adversary. At this time, the adversary cannot compute M US because R i = (AID i ) mod p is impossible to know. Therefore, our scheme can resist this kind of attack.
(3) User anonymity. In this kind of attack, the adversary eavesdrops { X i , CID, M i , R }, { S , M S } and { M US } of another user. The user's identity is encrypted with R i , which includes the secret AID i . Therefore, the adversary cannot trace who is authenticating and our scheme provides user anonymity.
(4) Impersonation attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary can impersonate either user or server. In our scheme, the adversary eavesdrops { X i , CID, M i , R } and { S , S }. However, he must send M US to cheat the server and this is impossible because r i and AID i are secret. Moreover, if he wants to impersonate the server, he needs to compute M S and this is impossible because AID i is secret. Therefore, our scheme can resist this kind of attack (7) Two-factor attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary can steal the user's biometrics, and then use this information to compute authentication key. We see that the smartcard includes { N, V i , hAID i , i }, so if there is no i , the adversary cannot compute AID i . Of course, if the smartcard is well-protected, the adversary has no way to compute AID i . Our scheme can resist this kind of attack.
(8) Perfect secrecy. In this kind of attack, the adversary has all secret keys of the users and the server. Of course, the service must be stopped at this time. However, we need to prevent the adversary from knowing past-transactions, and this means that all session keys must be secret. In our scheme, the session key is constructed from r i , r S , and AID i . Clearly, if the adversary knows (AID i ) and (AID i ), he cannot compute ( (AID i )) because of facing with CMDHP.
Efficiency Analysis.
To compare efficiency between our scheme and previous ones, we let "h" be the hash operation, "e/d" be the encryption/decryption, and "T" be computational operation of polynomial. At registration phase, our scheme uses 4 × h and 2 × T. Lin's scheme uses 1 × h, 1 × T, and 1× e/d. Zhu's scheme uses 5 × h. At authentication phase, our scheme uses 14 × h and 8 × T. Lin's scheme uses 4 × h, 5 × T, and 5 × e/d. Zhu's scheme uses 9 × h, 3 × T, and 2 × e/d. Our scheme's computational cost is more than previous ones due to security enhancement (see Table 3 ).
Also, we let t h , t T , and t e/d denote running-time corresponding to each operation, for example, h, T, and e/d (t h ≪ t e/d < t T ). To relatively measure the runningtime of three operations, we conduct an experiment using Java Cryptography Architecture with Bouncy Castle library in Android mobile device, core 4 CPU 1.2 GHz, and we have t h ≈ 0.00004ms, t e/d ≈ 0.09385ms, and t T ≈ 80 ms (see Figure 5) . 
Conclusion
This paper proposes a Chebyshev polynomials-based scheme in client-server environment. Although, our scheme takes more time than previous ones, it is advanced and resists some popular kinds of attack. Soon, we improve some techniques to reduce time-cost for computing Chebyshev polynomials.
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